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Abstract. In the crimeware world, financial botnets are a global threat to banking 
organizations. Such malware purposely performs financial fraud and steals 
critical information from clients¶ computers.  A common example of banking 
malware is the ZeuS botnet.  Recently, variants of this malware have targeted 
mobile platforms, as The-ZeuS-in-the-Mobile or Zitmo.  With the rise in mobile 
systems, platform security is becoming a major concern across the mobile world, 
with rising incidence of compromising Android devices.  In similar vein, there 
have been mobile botnet attacks on iPhones, Blackberry and Symbian devices.  
In this setting, we report on trends and developments of ZeuS and its variants. 
I Introduction 
Banks in many countries now provide access through the Internet to customer accounts. 
Such online services reduce the need for expensive retail offices and paper transactions.  
More recently, mobile platforms have established another channel for online banking, 
but these developments mean that financial services have become subject to new 
varieties of online attack.  
From such opportunities, underground markets have arisen through which 
cybercrooks trade services, such as spam, stolen credit card numbers, and do-it-yourself 
botnet kits.  The most popular DIY botnet kit is financial malware such as ZeuS [1].  
Several other types of financial malware have been observed in the wild, including 
Slapper, Coreflood, Kraken, Sinit, Nugache, Rustock, Conficker, Blackhole and NGR.  
Such malware is considered the most serious threat to internet security, because it gives 
perpetrators the potential to remotely control a large number of computers. ZeuS and 
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its family are the most advanced credential-stealing Trojans that have been found on 
the Internet.  
In this paper, Section II describes ZeuS and its family of Trojans.  In section III, we 
describe two types of botnet and in particular, mobile botnets.  Following this, we 
discuss predictions on the development of Zeus and its ilk.   
II ZeuS 
A. History of ZeuS 
The ZeuS Trojan, also called Zbot, WSNPOEM, NTOS, or PRG is the primary 
malicious software affecting the financial sector, both in terms of its effectiveness and 
infection rate.  6\PDQWHFFDOOVWKLVPDOZDUH³=HX6.LQJRIWKH8QGHUJURXQG&ULPH-
ware Toolkits´>@.  This banking Trojan first appeared in 2007.  In May of 2011, the 
full source code for the ZeuS toolkit was leaked onto various Internet sites.  The 
availability of this source code is a significant feature that has resulted in an explosion 
of new variants from the original ZeuS malware [3], and led to the development of 
several centralized Trojans based on ZeuS, such as ICE IX, KINS, and the more 
successful Citadel.  Also, decentralized Trojans based on ZeuS appeared in September 
2011, known also as P2P ZeuS or GameoverZeuS this variety uses a decentralized 
network infrastructure of compromised personal computers and web servers to execute 
command-and-control.  In May 2014, the Justice Department brought charges against 
the alleged author of the ZeuS Trojan Evgeniy Mikhailovich Bogachev of Anapa, 
Russian Federation.  In June 2014, the Justice Department launched a multi-national 
effort to take down the GameoverZeuS and CryptoLocker botnet infrastructures. 
The ZeuS Trojan penetrates large numbers of computers to steal data by logging 
keystrokes and copies of itself to other computers via instant and email messages. Once 
installed, hackers can control and monitor infected devices to obtain access to 
unauthorized data such as online accounts and credentials. As ZeuS is a credential-
stealing Trojans, it is sold through the underground economy in order to offer services 
to clients, with bug fixes to the first ZeuS codebase and with different features, for 
instance, video recording and sandbox detection.  The first two variations are based on 
centralized command and control (C&C) servers.  The security community now has the 
ability to track these command servers and block them.  ZeuS botnets have been found 
responsible for 44% of online malware infections during financial transactions and for 
approximately 90% of global banking fraud [2].  There were about 3.6 million 
computers infected by ZeuS in the USA alone during the period of 2009 and 2010.  This 
era is considered the most productive period for ZeuS [4]. 
The ZeuS Trojan is extremely dynamic and applies obfuscation techniques such as 
polymorphic, metamorphic encryption and packers in a network of bots [2, 40].  In 
order to defeat signature-based detection techniques, ZeuS re-encrypts itself 
automatically in each infection, thereby creating a new signature.  Through this 
concealment facility, ZeuS is able to hide malicious intent and effectively avoid 
malware signature detection. 
The ZeuS toolkit can be used to produce a strain of Trojans designed to damage and 
steal information.  Stealing details for online banking and other login credentials is the 
major focus of ZeuS.  The ZeuS kit can be obtained from underground forums, with 
older versions available for free, and the newest versions costing many thousands of 
dollars [5].  The impact of ZeuS infection can be very costly to an organization and 
differs to that of individuals. Since ZeuS first emerged in 2007, it has continued in its 
goal of information theft, however, there have been several obvious changes in how it 
addresses this aim.  ZeuS is simple to use and requires minimal technical knowledge 
[5].  Due to its competitive price and its user-friendly interface, the ZeuS crime-ware 
toolkit has become a preferred tools for attackers [4]. Banking details, or theft of 
personal login details can feel terrible to an individual, whereas the impact of infection 
for an organization can be devastating. 
B. ZeuS Functionality 
The key purpose of the ZeuS Trojan is to steal online credentials, as specified by the 
attacker.  Among the many actions it performs are information system gathering, online 
credential information stealing, C&C server contacting and protected storage 
information stealing [6]. Although technically ZeuS is a crime-ware kit designed to 
steal money, from other perspectives, it is a new online illegal business enterprise.  
Within this enterprise different organizations can cooperate in order to commit complex 
online fraud and theft.  This becomes a component in organized cybercriminal 
organizations.  In fact, Eastern European Organized Crime is the cybercriminal 
underground that is behind ZeuS.  Generally, the top ZeuS domains live in Ukraine and 
Russia [7]. 
C.  ZeuS Crime-ware Tool Components 
To steal money, the ZeuS toolkit takes control of devices and causes them to act as 
spying agents. There are five components that make up the general structure of this 
toolkit: 
 1. Control panel: this manages and controls the infected systems and gathers the 
stolen data and information. It also consists of PHP scripts that observe the botnet 
and display information to the botmaster. 
 2. A bXLOGHUWZRILOHVDUHJHQHUDWHGKHUHWKHµERWH[H¶ZKLFKLVWKHPDOZDUHELQDU\
DQGWKHµFRQILJELQ¶ZKLFKLVWKHHQFU\SWHGFRQILJXUDWLRQILOH 
 3. Configuration files: these comprise WZR ILOHV WKH µFRQILJW[W¶ contains crucial 
configuration LQIRUPDWLRQDQGWKHµZHELQMHFWVW[W¶this contains the content injection 
rules and is responsible for the recognition of targeted websites.  The configuration 
files also modify botnet parameters. 
 4. *HQHUDWHGHQFU\SWHGFRQILJXUDWLRQVILOHVµFRQILJELQ¶  An encrypted version of 
the botnet configuration parameters is held in these files. 
 5. *HQHUDWHGPDOZDUHELQDU\ILOHVµERWH[H¶. TKHVHILOHVLQIHFWWKHYLFWLPV¶GHYLFHV
as the bot binary [4]. 
As the ZeuS Trojan is designed to steal sensitive information, it carries a very light 
foot print.  ZeuS is based on the client-server model and requires a C&C server to 
transfer information through the network.  Once a YLFWLP¶VFRPSXWHUKDVEHHQLQIHFWHG
stolen data is immediately sent to a bot C&& VHUYHU WKURXJK DQ HQFU\SWHG µ+773
3267¶UHTXHVW The malware also allows cybercriminals and hackers to inject content 
into the web page of a bank as it is displayed in the infected computer browser.  An 
infected systems can be controlled remotely, with the stolen data sent to a drop server 
controlled by the botmaster.  ZeuS is a readily available and the most widely-spread 
malware package contains the required tools to build and control a botnet.  While ZeuS 
mostly operates on computers using Microsoft Windows, Blackberry and Android 
phones have become targets since 2012 [8, 9].  
This banking Trojan spreads through phishing scams, drive-by-downloads and by 
tricking unsuspecting users into clicking infected links.  According to [39], a 2009 
survey found that ZeuS had compromised more than 74,000 FTP accounts on websites 
of businesses worldwide, including NASA, Bank of America, ABC, Business Week, 
Oracle, Amazon, and Monster.com.  After execution, ZeuS automatically gathers any 
Internet Explorer or FTP passwords contained within Protected Storage [11].   
D. ZeuS Variants 
GameoverZeuS (P2P): Gameover ZeuS (GOZ) is a further development of the ZeuS 
Trojan that is built upon a P2P botnet infrastructure.  The developers behind P2P ZeuS 
made several updates to the source code over the years of operating the botnet to 
improve its resilience against takedown attempts.  Cybercriminals used this variant in 
order to obtain valuable data such as personal information, passwords, credit card 
numbers, customer data, confidential commercial information or any other data that 
related to banking [14].  The P2P variant of ZeuS represents a technical evolution away 
from the centralized botnet model and this infrastructure made disruption and attacker 
attribution more complicated. Despite this, there are many drawbacks in a P2P network.  
The decentralized nature of the P2P ZeuS botnet permits investigators to enumerate the 
infected botnet population by recursively crawling each node's peer list.  It is also 
possible to poison peer lists by injecting fake peer nodes into the P2P network, which 
has enabled researchers to sinkhole and neutralize P2P botnets (e.g., Storm, Waledac, 
and Kelihos).   
The P2P ZeuS crew receives considerable support from the products and services 
offered by the underground community, who collectively plan and execute successful 
cybercriminal operations.  Moreover, the large number of available compromised 
computers and web servers provides a robust and low cost infrastructure for a range of 
malicious activities [1,12,38].  
The single C&C server is a weak point in the malware structural design and it is the 
target for law enforcement organizations when dealing with ZeuS botnet.  To counter 
this risk, the Zbot variant includes a DGA (domain generation algorithm) that produces 
new domain names list to which the bots try to connect in case the C&C server cannot 
be reached.  This feature made the C&C servers difficult and resistant to takedown 
attempts.  The peers in the botnet can act as independent C&C servers and are able to 
download commands or configuration files between them, as well as sending stolen 
data to the malicious servers. 
P2P ZeuS is known for its resilience to takedowns because of the P2P connection to 
its C&C server compared with other variants of ZeuS like IceIX, Citadel and KINS, 
which employ centralized C&C servers.  Centralized ZeuS variants are spread as 
builder kits in the underground market, offering a chance for users to construct their 
own ZeuS botnet.  But this is no longer available for P2P ZeuS, which is based on a 
single coherent main P2P network separated into numerous virtual sub-botnets by a 
hardcoded sub-botnet identifier in each bot binary.  Whereas the ZeuS P2P network is 
maintained and sometimes entirely updated, the sub-botnets are independently 
controlled to accomplish several malicious actions. 
Gameover ZeuS is often propagated through spam and phishing messages.  Infected 
machines can perform unauthorized activities such as sending spam, participate in 
DDoS attacks, and harvest victim credentials for online services, including banking 
services [13, 36].  This botnet infects networks but, as a result of its polymorphic nature, 
has a low detection rates and thereby poses a high persistent risk.  Once a device is 
infected, it is difficult to remove this infection because this version of ZeuS contains a 
Necurs rootkit.  According to SophosLabs, this rootkit can be used to better conceal 
malware files, and make it more difficult to locate or remove the malware once it is 
active [15]. 
The latest version of Gameover ZeuS WULHG WRµJameover¶ the anti-virus business.  
However, in June 2014, a large international effort involving enforcement agencies and 
security firms, blocked the spread of the Gameover ZeuS botnet and managed to control 
servers that were important for CryptoLocker (discussed later in this section) [16, 17, 
8, 9].  
Reviewing the extent of the Gameover ZeuS problem, the latest numbers in Heimdal 
Security database, and according to detectives in the Bank Info Security and Krebson 
Security, globally almost 1.2 million Microsoft Windows-based computers were 
infected up until the takedown operation in June 2014.  This figure could increase if the 
botnet infrastructure is restored, and this is a great concern for the security community 
[18, 19, 20]. 
SpyEye: SpyEye is a Trojan that targets online banking users.  %\KLMDFNLQJWKHXVHU¶V
ZHEFDPVDQGPLFURSKRQHVWKLVPDOZDUHHQDEOHVF\EHUFULPLQDOVWRVWHDOXVHUV¶DFFRXQW 
credentials and empty their accounts by means of its keylogger.  The SkyEye toolkit is 
widespread among cybercriminals since they can modify it to attack specific 
institutions or businesses.  Once a targeted user starts an online transaction from his 
bank account, this Trojan is able to start its operation.  Similar to its older cousin, ZeuS, 
SpyEye is no longer being developed by its original author, but is still broadly used by 
cybercriminals [9, 8].  
Ice IX: Ice IX is one of the most sophisticated pieces of financial malware.  This is 
ZeuS variant improved upon source code from ZeuS v2, aiming to evade tracker sites 
that monitor most ZeuS C&C servers [8, 9]. 
Citadel: After the ZeuS source code release in 2011, the Citadel variant appeared as 
a popular choice in the underground market for use in financial fraud and to commit 
complex µ0DQ-in-the-%URZVHU¶DWWDFNV.  Citadel has built upon the base capabilities of 
ZeuS and added numerous developments to the malware.  This toolkit expanded the 
scope of application and enabled the targeting of more varieties of web browser.  
Citadel also provides a platform for other illegal revenue schemes such as installation 
of ransomware. According to [21], the Citadel code matches around 75% of the original 
ZeuS while the remaining 25% comprises new features that are unique to Citadel.  
Primary among these features are: Local Pharming, More function hooks, C&C server 
sidH7URMDQ¶VHQFU\SWLRQPHWKRGand Video-grabbing [8, 17, 22, 9]. 
Carberp: Carberp is a banking Trojan that is considered to be one of the most broadly 
spread financial malware in Russia.  Like other Trojans in the ZeuS family, Carberp 
commits financial fraud through its ability to steal crucial data from infected devices 
and download different data from C&C servers.  This malware differs from other 
banking Trojans because it has several legitimate web resources that are used to gather 
information and possibly make fraudulent transactions.  In addition to injecting a code 
into web pages, Carberp attempts to exploit some vulnerabilities in the operating 
systems so as to escalate to administrative privileges [8, 9].  Indications are that 
cybercriminals have botnets on over 25,000 infected devices. 
Bugat: This is another banking Trojan derived from ZeuS that targets browsing 
activities and returns information from e-banking sessions.  As well as having similar 
capabilities to the original ZeuS, Bugat can upload files from an infected PC, download 
and execute code.  Bugat communicates with a C&C server, from which it receives 
instructions and updates to monetary websites.  Attackers insert attractive malicious 
links in the emails they send to targeted victims in order to spread this malware.  When 
the user clicks a malicious link, they are directed to a fraudulent infected website from 
where the Bugat executable downloads on to the visitoU¶V system.  Collected 
LQIRUPDWLRQLVVHQWWRWKHDWWDFNHU¶VUHPRWHVHUYHU[8, 9]. 
Shylock: In similar vein, Shylock is financial malware that aims to retrieve bank 
credentials for fraudulent purposes.  Once installed, the remote C&C servers controlled 
by the cybercriminals communicate with Shylock to send to and receive data from the 
infected devices.  Like P2P ZeuS, this malware uses a domain generation algorithm 
produce a number of domains that can be used to interact with infected systems and 
servers.  This malware employs two possible attack vectors.  The first is by injecting 
web pages via JavaScript.  This generates a pop-up window that has the user download 
a (malicious) plugin that appears to be essential for the media display on the website.  
The second attack vector is through drive-by downloads on compromised websites, 
e.g., by inserting malicious code in advertisements which are then put on legitimate 
websites - a method known as malicious advertising [8, 9].  
Torpig: Torpig is another sophisticated and complex variety of financial malware that 
targets private and financial information, including bank account and credit card details.  
Torpig botnets may send spam emails and commit unauthorised transactions.  In 
addition, Torpig generates domains names using a domain generation algorithm to 
locate the C&C servers.  The attack vector for this Trojan is drive-by downloads [8, 9]. 
According to [11], investigation of the largest banking botnets from 2013 shows that 
900 financial organizations have been targeted all over the world. This source indicates 
that Gameover ZeuS has the highest percentage impact at 38%, followed by Citadel 
with 33 %, then ZeuS with approximately 13%.  Most of these malware breaches are at 
US financial institutions with more than half of these botnets focused on the 25 biggest 
financial organizations, not only in the US but also in other mature markets like the 
UK, Canada, Germany, France, Spain, and Italy [23].  
CryptoLocker: This is a ransomware Trojan that LQIHFWV WKH YLFWLP¶V V\VWHP via 
seemingly legitimate email attachment, from a well-known institution or company.  
This well-known malware encrypts system files and demands a ransom in exchange for 
the decryption key.  Not only does it access private data or steals user¶VPRQH\EXW
once it encrypts XVHU¶V LQIRUPDWLRQ QRERG\ FDQ GHFU\SW WKHVH ILOHV DJDLQ  After 
encryption, CryptoLocker displays a ransom window stating that the user should pay 
an amount of money in a specific time in order to recover files.  Although CryptoLocker 
can be removed, the encrypted files cannot be recovered without the key.  In addition, 
CryptoLocker is dangerous since the YLFWLPV¶confidential information is compromised. 
According to federal authorities, in April 2014 CryptoLocker infected more than 
234,000 computers, half of them located in the US [20]. 
As noted earlier, in June 2014, servers that were important for CryptoLocker were 
affected by a global takedown effort when the spread of the Gameover ZeuS botnet was 
blocked.  Ransomware continues to evolve, especially in the form of file-encrypting 
malware.  Recently, ransomware has begun to target mobile devices.  Availability of 
malware source code and generation tools has helped cybercrooks to reach mobile 
platforms [24]. 
E. Typical spreading method for financial malware 
Most financial malware is spread by one of two methods: 
x Drive-by downloads: a drive-by download happens when the user visits a 
website or clicks a misleading pop-up window. 
x Spam campaigns: the user receives an e-mail message from a well-known 
organization with some false banking information attached or with a link 
included in the e-mail. Once, the user clicks the link or downloads the attached 
file to the e-mail, the system will be infected [10,37]. 
In the next section, we consider the architecture of centralized botnets like ZeuS and 
decentralized botnets like Gameover ZeuS. 
III Botnets 
A. Overview 
Botnets pose a serious threat to Internet security.  A botnet is a network of compromised 
machines under the control of a malicious entity, typically referred to as the botmaster.  
The compromised computers, called bots, are controlled by a C&C server in order to 
engage in malicious activities such as sending spam, stealing login credentials, stealing 
personal information or participating in distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks 
on other systems (such as government or commercial websites).  These bots are 
designed to take over many Internet hosts.  Botnet threats are complex since the sets of 
participating computers can be assigned various tasks, including seeking out and 
infecting further hosts.  According to [39], such systems have been used by hackers 
seeking to bring down web sites such as the British Serious Organized Crime Agency 
and the US Central Intelligence Agency.  
B. Types of Botnets 
There are two principal botnet architectures: centralized and peer to peer.  Some 
botnets, like Conficker and ZeuS, change their architectures in new variants from 
centralized to P2P.  Recent botnets mostly use HTTP, TCP and UDP as their 
communication protocol.  However, some botnets, like Gameover ZeuS, use 
specialised P2P network protocols [16].  Some generic characteristics of several real 
world botnets (Conficker, Kraken, Rustock, Storm, TDL4, Torpig, Waledac, ZeuS and 
P2P ZeuS) are described by [24] 
1. Centralised botnets.  
The most common type of botnet is the centralized form in which all computers are 
joined to a single C&C.  The C&C looks for new bots to connect, then registers these 
bots in its database, sends them commands selected by the botnet owner by tracking 
their status.  These botnets are easy to create, to manage and also they respond to 
instructions very quickly.  Nevertheless, centralised botnets are relatively easy to 
combat.  If the C&C is put out of commission, the whole botnet is neutralised.  All bots 
in the centralised botnet are visible to the C&C. 
2. Hierarchical (Decentralized or P2P) botnets.  
For centralized botnets, if a bot is found and interrupted, the central C&C server can be 
recognized. The entire botnet is disabled when the server is taken down. In order to 
avoid this, and in particular, to overcome the inherent drawback and shortcoming of the 
centralized botnets, peer-to-peer botnets are designed. P2P technologies have been used 
to create hierarchical botnets. In a decentralized botnet, bots connect to several infected 
machines on a bot network rather than to a C&C centre. Instructions are transmitted 
from one bot to another. Each of them has a list of many neighbours, and any command 
received by a bot from one of its neighbours will be sent to the other bots, further 
distributing it across the zombie network. In this case, in order to control the entire 
botnet by the cybercriminal, they need to have access to at least one computer on the 
zombie network. Practically, building P2P botnets is a difficult job, because each 
recently infected device requires to be provided with bots list to which it will connect 
on the zombie network. Combating centralized botnets is a much easier task than 
combating decentralized networks as an active P2P botnet has not got a control centre. 
Botmaster just needs to have control of one bot to control the botnet. Although 
disrupting this kind of botnets is difficult, designing and managing this kind of botnets 
is difficult for the botmaster [25].  
C. Mobile Botnets and Malicious Activities 
Mobile systems is a fast-developing IT area and, as mobile devices become more 
widely used, their role and their security is a growing concern internationally.  
Inevitably, mobile phones and networks are subject to the threat of mobile botnets.  A 
mobile botnet may refer to a collection of compromised smartphones that are under 
control of botmasters using C&C servers.  Although computer-based botnets have 
become a severe threat to computer systems - as common platforms for some attacks, 
mobile botnets are presently not as popular for reasons such as resource issues, limited 
battery power, and Internet access constraints.  Accordingly, the occurrence of practical 
mobile botnets and related research are presently both very limited.  Nevertheless, this 
is likely to change with the spread of smartphones, now used by billions of clients due 
to their increasing computing ability and efficient Internet access.  Furthermore, 
smartphones are commonly used to store a huge amount of sensitive data that may be 
used in online payment transactions [26]. 
Unfortunately, many users do not pay attention to the security updates on these 
devices so these devices are often not well-protected compared to computers and their 
networks.  Mobile botnets (Mobot) have not yet been widely manifested, as they have 
only recently migrated to mobile infrastructures.  Although these botnets tend to 
develop rapidly, so do takedowns.   
The following section gives examples of current mobile botnets in order to highlight 
their presence and their negative effects on mobile network environments [27].  The 
growth of open-source smartphone platforms such as Android affords more opportunity 
for hackers to perform malicious activities [26]. 
Mobile botnet attack vectors are investigated by [28].  Through identification of 
significant parameters from their taxonomy, [28] conducted a comparison to explore 
effects of existing mobile botnets.  Another study by [27], presents an overview of 
mobile botnets, trends and characteristics through a survey of well-known Android 
malware applications [29].  The most recent attacks on Android devices are ZeuS in the 
Mobile or Zitmo, DroidDream, Android.Bmaster, Ikee.B, AnserverBot, TigerBot, and 
Geimini.  There have also been mobile botnet attacks on iPhones (SMS attacks), 
Blackberry and Symbian devices.  This section gives an overview of some recent 
mobile botnets (summarized in Table 1). 
  
Botnet Name Creation/ 
detection 
date 
Platform Spread Technique Functionality Specific Features 
Ikee.B November 
2009 
Apple iPhone Self-Propagation Carries a malicious payload (data exfiltration), and probes C&C 
for new control instructions, generates revenue and steals 
private data 
Specific Targeted Victims, Specific 
Geographical Distribution 
Geimini December 
2010 
Android mobile 
devices 
Opens a back door and 
transmits information 
from the device to a 
specific URL 
Steals privacy related info, sends location info, IMEI and IMSI 
info, sends & reads SMS and erase traces, addresses book to a 
server, and list of installed apps, downloads and prompts user 
to install apps, launches a web browser with given URL. 
Able to infect legitimate applications 
Zitmo September 
2010 
Android, Symbian, 
Windows Mobile, 
BlackBerry 
Infected SMS, social 
engineering techniques 
Unauthorized transactions, including mobile banking attacks, 
mobile transaction number (mTAN) thefts. 
Specific Targeted Victims: European users 
AnserverBot September 
2011 
Android mobile 
devices 
Trojan Applications, social 
engineering techniques 
Installs backdoor to get sensitive private data, sends fake SMS, 
uses different techniques to regularly check self-security and 
integrity 
Self-protection,  
two layers C&C. using Java  
reflection-based method invocation,  
self-verification of signatures, aggressive 
code obfuscation and data encryption, 
dynamic code loading to evade detection  
DroidDream February 
2012 
Android mobile 
devices 
Exploit Techniques  
Trojanised Applications  
Rooted phone via Android Debug Bridge vulnerability, sent 
premium-rate SMS messages at night, download malicious 
apps, and steals private data 
Specific Operational Times: 11 pm to 8 am. 
Android.Bmaster  February 
2012 
Android mobile 
devices  
Exploit Techniques 
Trojanised Applications 
Opens a back door, downloads files, steals potentially 
confidential info from compromised device, and generates 
revenue.  
Specific  
geographical  
dissemination: 
China. 
TigerBot  April 2012 Android mobile 
devices 
Trojanised Applications Allows remote access & can be controlled via SMS messages. 
Steals contacts lists & screenshots, changes network settings, 
and controls running processes. Private data theft; Change 
Device Settings  
Self- Protection  
 
HijackRAT  2014 Android mobile 
devices 
Downloaded Applications  Steals &sends SMS, initiates nasty app updates, steals 
contacts, scans for authentic banking apps installed on the 
ǀŝĐƚŝŵ ?ƐĚĞǀŝĐĞĂŶĚƐǁĂƉƚŚĞŵǁŝƚŚŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƐƵƚŝůŝƚ ĞƐ ?ƐƚĞĂůƐ
banking credentials, private data theft, Spoofing, and remote 
access.  
DĂƐŬƐĂƐ ?'ŽŽŐůĞ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞ&ƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ? ?ŝŶĚƐ
both the newest & older hijacking 
techniques, tries to deactivate any mobile 
security/ antivirus software on Android  
Table 1: An overview of recent mobile botnets 
 
ZeuS-in-the-mobile (ZitMo) is an innovative example of mobile malware.  The ZeuS 
botnet has transferred from PCs to mobile devices and as a result targeted online 
banking.  It is designed to use social engineering techniques to steal mobile transaction 
authorization numbers (mTAN) that are sent in SMS messages by banks to its 
FXVWRPHUV¶ PRELOH GHYLFHV  $Q 606 LV VHQW ZLWK D IDNH 85/ DVNLQJ WKH XVHU WR
download a security question that is, in reality, the Zeus-in-the-mobile bot.  One of the 
distinguished features of Zitmo is the range of supported operating systems, such as 
Symbian, BlackBerry, Windows Mobile, and Android.  Small groups of mobile users 
in several European countries, customers of specific banks, have recently been attacked 
by Zitmo [27, 29, 25, 30].   
DroidDream is a mobile botnet-based malware that first appeared in 2011 and 
exploits Android-based mobile systems in order to gain root access to these devices to 
obtain unique identification information such as product ID, or model number of the 
mobile device.  Once the system has been infected, the compromised device can install 
and download another application and extra executable programs and features without 
the user noticing, while providing backdoor root access for criminals.  The additional 
application prevents the removal of DroidDream, and then sends sensitive information 
WRLWV&	&VHUYHUVXFKDVWKHXVHU¶VFRXQWU\DQGGHYLFHPRGHO,QRUGHUWRURRWWKH
smartphone, DroidDream uses two different tools which are rageagainstthecage and 
exploid.  This Trojan works stealthily, at night, at a time that the mobiles are not used.  
DroidDream aims to be a quiet Mobot [27, 25, 29, 28, 30]. 
Android.Bmaster infects mobile phones, through a range of exploits and Trojan 
applications in order to generate money through telephony, video or SMS services.  
6\PDQWHF KDVGHVFULEHG LW DV ³$0LOOLRQ-'ROODU0RELOH%RWQHW´ VLQFH LW KDV JDLQHG
millions of dollars through its services [31].  Moreover, this malware records a range 
of information on the infected users to its C&C server.  Recently, criminals and 
attackers illegally gained millions of dollars using this Trojan.  This is due to the high 
rate of infected mobile phones across the world [27, 25, 30]. 
IKee.B is a malicious program that targets and infects jail broken iPhones in order 
to obtain data and information. This botnet is considered to be a proof-of concept that 
botnets work on mobile phones with nearly the same functionality as computer-based 
botnets.  Dynamically the IKee.B botnet scans the network of the iPhone IP addresses.  
IKee.B tries a self-propagation technique in order to infect other vulnerable iPhone 
devices that are located in other countries and sends stolen confidential data to its C&C 
server in Lithuania over Wi-Fi networks or 3G.  When IKee.B is activated on an iPhone, 
it can change default passwords, send financial information in SMS messages to a 
remote server and also connect via HTTP to a remote server to download other 
components.  The only defensive action against this infection is to fully reset the iPhone 
and restore all settings to factory defaults [27, 25, 28, 30]. 
In 2011, NetQin Security Research Centre identified a sophisticated new Android 
malware known as AnserverBot.  In order to infect mobile phones and steal sensitive 
data, AnserverBot installs a backdoor. The malware attaches itself to standard 
applications, sends fake SMS messages and uses social engineering.  To evade 
detection, it employs Java reflection-based method invocation, self-verification of 
signatures, aggressive code obfuscation and data encryption, and dynamic code 
loading, as well as detection and removal of any mobile security software.  In addition 
to regularly checking its own security and integrity, AnserverBot has a double layer 
C&C tool that operates over public blogs.  Installed security software can be detected 
by AnserverBot and may be deactivated or removed [27, 25, 32, 30]. TigerBot is 
unusual in being completely controlled via SMS messages.  This botnet has the abilities 
to record calls and to gather private information.  C&C messages can be received as 
SMS messages by TigerBot, and will be invisible to the mobile device user.  This 
malware operates mainly as spyware and uses common application names and icons, 
such as Google search [27].  Mobile network operators (MNO) might pay more 
attention to the detection of mobile botnet since they will be affected by losses through 
malware activity [30].  
Geinimi is a backdoor Trojan that has been injected into many different Android 
applications.  Such malware disturbs the normal operation of Android devices and seeks 
unauthorized access to stored credentials.  Geinimi has many capabilities, for example, 
it can fake legitimate banking applications and steal private information.  In addition, 
can relay location information, download and make the user install applications.  This 
malware also communicates with the server via SMS messages, remove traces, 
launches a web browser with given URL, sends phone and subscriber information, 
LQFOXGLQJWKHXVHU¶VDGGUHVVERRNV>@ 
The HijackRAT Trojan comes attached to a malicious Android application and 
combines both the newest and older hijacking methods.  HijackRAT masks itself as 
µ*RRJOH6HUYLFH)UDPHZRUN¶DQGDOORZVKDFNHUVUHPRWHFRQWURORIWKHYLFWLP¶VGHYLFH
The App can steal and relay SMS messages, initiate malware updates, steal contacts, 
scan for authentic banking apps and swap them for imitation utilities.  HijackRAT also 
tries to deactivate any antivirus software installed on the infected Android device. [34].  
IV Discussion 
ZeuS is the most significant financial malware created so far and there is little evidence 
that its impact is fading.  Because of its wide distribution, ZeuS threatens a broader 
number of organizations, even outside the financial sector.  ZeuS attacks are still 
occurring and may increase as cybercriminals develop more sophisticated concealment 
and evasion techniques in order to widen infection to many more users across the globe.  
Already, the transition to hybrid centralized or hybrid decentralized botnets poses 
obstacles to takedown.  We may also anticipate a move to Cloud-based malware.  On 
the positive side, with recent improvements in anti-malware techniques, the impact of 
ZeuS functions may be limited.  Of course, we should expect more advanced ZeuS 
versions in due course.   
In conjunction with such malware developments, we can expect to see new forms 
of aggressive attacks, such as water-holing and spear-phishing.  As cybercriminals 
continue to evolve such tactics, security firms must maintain vigilance and strive to 
combat such attacks through advances in anti-malware software.  More directed 
development of ZeuS-based botnets may be linked to state-sponsored attacks, with 
associated loss of international trust, as occurred after Edward Snowden's disclosures. 
Although the takedown operation against Gameover ZeuS succeeded in cutting its 
communication infrastructure, Gameover ZeuS has now switched from P2P 
infrastructures to DGAs [35, 23].  Two new versions using this evasion technique have 
been discovered in the wild.  Significantly, the Gameover ZeuS botnet was not entirely 
destroyed, only interrupted.  Although the takedown almost quashed the Cryptolocker 
malware, similar ransomware has since increased in new applications such as 
Cryptowall and cryptosimple.  Furthermore, this variety of malware has recently 
targeted mobile devices [24].   
Indications are that anonymous and untrustworthy app stores will increase as a 
source of mobile malware, driven by malvertising.  Ransomware is expected to spread 
across a wider range of mobile devices, using more sophisticated measures to avoid 
early detection and a move to new ransom payment methods with the rise in crypto-
currencies. 
The ready availability of source code and malware kits has helped cybercrooks 
target mobile platforms but many cybercriminal groups will continue to target 
traditional platforms, such as PCs.  The prevalence of legacy systems, including MS-
Windows, Apple Macintosh and Linux, means that vulnerabilities in operating systems 
will continue to offer opportunities for malware infection.  
V Conclusion  
ZeuS is the most significant banking malware currently in existence.  It is a crime-ware 
tool that aims DWVWHDOLQJXVHUV¶RQOLQHEDQNLQJFUHGHQWLDOV  This Trojan is still evolving 
and will continue to pose a serious threat to online users and organisations.  The scope 
of threat from ZeuS and its derivatives has been growing as the functionality of its 
toolkit expands.  Mobile malware is a new frontier and the rise in mobile devices means 
a rise in mobile botnets.  All internet and mobile device users are potential targets and 
the threat will increase as malware continues to extend in functionality, availability and 
ease of use. 
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